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RULEMAKING INACTION AND THE FAILURE 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO † 
ABSTRACT 
The Trump administration may be the first presidency to go four years 
without promulgating new significant regulations to protect people and 
the environment. Although administrative law protects regulatory 
beneficiaries when agencies revoke or modify previous rules, those 
protections evaporate when an agency rejects a rulemaking petition, 
fails to answer a petition for years, or fails to work on pending 
regulatory protections. In effect, the courts have outsourced agency 
accountability for rulemaking inaction to political oversight, but as a 
defense of the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, political 
accountability is the “Maginot Line” of oversight. Despite the difficulty 
of judging an agency’s claim that it has higher priorities or that it needs 
more time to make a decision, judges should require more detailed 
explanations. Although less trusting judicial review is not without its 
problems, the current approach of abject deference to agency inaction 
ignores Congress’ commitment to protect people and the environment 
as specified in an agency’s mandate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presidents can pursue deregulation using three strategies: the 
revocation of rules, the modification of them, or rulemaking inaction. 
Inaction involves refusing to start any new rules to protect the public 
or the environment or to delay regulatory rules already started to the 
point of a crawl. While these steps do remove or modify existing rules, 
they are still deregulatory. Inaction, despite the name, is deregulatory 
because, as the Article will develop, Congress creates regulatory 
agencies with the expectation that they will use their delegated 
authority to protect people and the environment in the manner that 
legislation indicates. When an administration engages in rulemaking 
inaction, it fails this expectation, making its action deregulatory. 
Moreover, the deregulatory impact is more than four (or eight) years 
when you consider it will take a proregulatory administration years to 
adopt a regulation after it takes office. Fans of the television show 
Parks and Recreation will recognize this as the “Ron Swanson” 
strategy.1 
President Trump is unique among presidents in channeling Ron 
Swanson. Other administrations have employed rulemaking inaction 
as a deregulatory strategy. In the Reagan administration, for example, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) issued 
no new health standards for five years.2 It is probably not coincidental 
that the two administrators of OSHA during that period were both 
extremely hostile to the agency’s mission.3 But the Trump 
 
 1. Swanson, a fictional character from the situational comedy television series Parks and 
Recreation, is the director of the parks and recreation department of a fictional city in Indiana 
who, as a strong libertarian, supports the elimination of his department since public parks should 
not even exist and, in the meantime, strategizes how to do nothing to advance the mandate of his 
department. See WIKIPEDIA, Ron Swanson, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ron_Swanson 
[https://perma.cc/ZXM8-WDRV].  
 2. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED 
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 61–63 (1993).  
 3. See id.  
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administration is the first to employ this tactic on a government-wide 
basis. President Trump’s executive order requiring agencies to 
eliminate two rules for each new regulatory rule they promulgate has 
stopped the entire government from adopting regulatory rules.4 In 
2017, the regulatory agenda indicated that agencies took sixty-seven 
deregulatory actions and only three regulatory actions.5 There is no 
doubt that agencies in the Trump administration can defend their lack 
of interest in new protective regulation as simply a matter of priority 
setting—they are too busy deregulating—but the question remains 
whether the courts should accept this claim as existing administrative 
law appears to require them to do. 
Among the three deregulatory strategies, administrative law 
provides the weakest check—an almost nonexistent check in fact—on 
rulemaking inaction as a strategy of deregulation as compared to 
revocation and modification. Although scholars have noted the impact 
of rulemaking inaction on protection of the public and the 
environment, they have been reluctant to support changing the existing 
approach to judicial review because of the judiciary’s difficulty in 
judging agency priorities.6 
This Article challenges the current judicial calculus that elevates 
the significance of agency priority setting while giving little or no 
weight to the significance of legislative commitments to protect people 
and the environment. My starting point is the recognition that 
rulemaking inaction can, and sometimes is, a deregulation game, 
exploiting administrative law for ideological motivations. If 
administrative law is to ensure that administrative decisions are a 
matter of law, and not simply ideology, courts must  raise their 
 
 4. See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (2017). 
 5. Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Trump’s 2018 Regulatory Reform Agenda By the Numbers, 
FORBES (May 10, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2018/05/10/trumps-
2018-regulatory-reform-agenda-by-the-numbers/#53a5fc97cd29 [https://perma.cc/4QSX-ASL3]. 
The Executive Order only applies to significant regulations, but some significant regulations are 
exempt from the order. See Cheryl Bolen, Trump’s 2-for-1 Regulatory Policy Yields Minimal 
Results, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trumps-2for1-regulatory-
n73014470324/ [https://perma.cc/GA7T-X6WL]. 
 6. See, e.g., Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach 
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1381, 1427–31 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When 
Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 161, 172–76 (2014) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of agency discretion in priority setting in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)); see 
generally, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency 
Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008) (arguing that courts should defer to agencies 
in resource allocation among competing priorities). 
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expectations about what constitutes a satisfactory justification for 
putting protective regulations at the back of a queue. A lack of 
curiosity is a failure of administrative law, not an implementation of it. 
My analysis begins with the deregulation game. In analyzing the 
strategic choices available to agencies from a positive political 
perspective, the choice of rulemaking inaction, despite the opposition 
of regulatory beneficiaries, is the strategy the courts are most likely to 
accept. Moreover, if Congress is aligned with the president, the strategy 
is likely to be supported by both it and regulated entities. 
Administrative law also aids and abets this strategic choice. 
Because the revocation of rules must overcome the rulemaking record 
established by the adopting agency, the revoking agency must persuade 
a court that there is no need for a rule—some rule—which is likely to 
be difficult. Rather, an agency is better off modifying a rule because 
judges recognize that an agency has more than one nonarbitrary policy 
option. Nonetheless, judicial review still has some bite because the 
modifying agency must choose among those reasonable options. The 
courts are most likely to accept rulemaking inaction because judges use 
abject deference to review such actions, and because petitioners do not 
have a record on which they contest agency claims about rulemaking 
priorities. 
The last Part contends the current judicial approach to rulemaking 
inaction fails to fulfill the function of administrative law as “legal 
civics”—requiring an agency to offer reasons that justify its action as 
implementing its statutory mandate. Specifically, judicial review of 
agency action, as currently practiced, is so deferential that it effectively 
ignores Congress’ commitment to protect people and the environment 
as specified in an agency’s mandate. That mandate is not neutral 
between action and inaction. It is not ambivalent between regulation 
and the lack of regulation. Instead, the role of the courts is therefore to 
establish both a ceiling and a floor that cabins the policy space in which 
an agency can operate. Just as an agency cannot exceed the legal 
authority delegated by Congress, it also cannot avoid its statutory 
obligation to protect the public. 
The courts today only enforce the ceiling. It is time—past time, 
really—that judges enforce the floor as well. If administrative law is to 
require that agencies operate in a legal manner—that is, within the 
bounds of their statutory mandate—courts must stop giving agencies 
carte blanche concerning rulemaking inaction. Otherwise, 
administrative law will continue to fail to recognize rulemaking 
inaction as an illegitimate and undemocratic act. 
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I.  THE DEREGULATION GAME 
In analyzing the strategic choices available to political actors, 
analysts have employed a game theoretic model that identifies likely 
outcomes based on structural factors that shape political behavior, such 
as constitutional or legal rules.7 When you model an administration’s 
options to engage in deregulation as a set of strategic choices, it 
illustrates that rulemaking inaction is likely to be the most successful 
of the three deregulatory strategies. Although this choice does not 
eliminate regulation, it nevertheless is deregulatory because it can 
postpone any new protective regulations for years, even if a president 
is not elected for a second term. It has this impact because under 
existing structural factors, particularly agency resources and judicial 
expectations, it takes anywhere from four to eight years or more to 
promulgate a significant rule in any administration that follows the 
administration committed to inaction.8 
A president with a deregulation agenda can direct agencies to 
revoke rules, modify them, or choose not to promulgate new regulatory 
rules. The following diagrams model the strategic preferences of 
 
 7. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (using game theory to illustrate the different kinds of legal 
problems); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 
523 (1992) (applying game theory to analyzing Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, 
and Accountability, 57 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1994) (applying game theory to analyzing 
OSHA and EPA rulemaking); Eric R. Claeys, Note, The Article III, Section 2 Games: A Game-
Theoretic Account of Standing and Other Justiciability Doctrines, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321 (1994) 
(applying game theory to analyzing justiciability doctrines).  
 8. For an explanation of why a rule takes a minimum of between 47 and 95 months to 
promulgate, see Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Judiciary 
Comm., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro, University Distinguished Chair in 
Law, Wake Forest School of Law), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Shaprio_RAA_
Tesimony_102511.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XUZ-AGUM]. For a general discussion of the 
ossification of rulemaking, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AUTO SAFETY 9–25 (1990) (discussing abandonment of rulemaking by the NHTSA); Frank B. 
Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 
1013, 1020–27 (2000); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387–1436 (1992). Some scholars have disputed that the rulemaking 
delay is a serious problem. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the 
Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–
1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1421 (2012). But this empirical work fails to account for the 
fact that controversial, significant rules take years, while other noncontroversial, minor rules take 
much less time. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing 
the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1497–98 (2012); Sidney A. Shapiro & 
Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness Review Made Reasonable: Structural and Conceptual Reform 
of the “Hard Look,” 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 331, 354 (2016). 
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regulatory beneficiaries (B), Congress (C), regulated entities (E), and 
the president (P). The likelihood that judges (J) will affirm the 
president’s preferred policy is found above the line in the diagrams. 
The distance between the actors, as pictured, is inexact, and the 
illustrations are meant to indicate a comparative or relative ordering. 
In Figure 1, the president (P) and regulated entities (E) are pictured as 
preferring revocation as a deregulatory strategy. Congress (C) is 
likewise supportive, but regulatory beneficiaries (B) have a strong 
preference against revocation. The courts (J) are depicted in Figure 1 
as being resistant to the revocation of rules, although not as much so as 
regulatory beneficiaries (B). 
In Figure 1, there is a significant gap between the president’s 
policy preference to revoke existing regulations and the likelihood the 
courts will affirm a revocation. To be sure, the outcome of judicial 
review can vary depending on the ideological preferences of the judge,9 
but a judge is less likely to act strategically when an administration has 
clearly or obviously violated legal doctrines or its statutory mandate.10 
The judge’s behavior is therefore bounded because at some point an 
agency’s deregulatory decisions are likely to be clear violations of 
existing case law as explained in Part II.A. 
 
Figure 1: Revoke  
 
  
 
Figure 1 assumes the administration and regulated entities have 
similar preferences for revoking a rule, but those conditions will not 
always hold. For example, regulated entities may not have a strong 
preference for the revocation of rules because, having already come 
into compliance with rule, a significant portion of the cost of 
compliance is a sunk cost for them. Then again, a president might have 
a weaker preference for the revocation of rules than regulated entities 
 
 9. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 832 (2006); Thomas J. Miles & Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 788–89 (2008).  
 10. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative 
Law: Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 334–36 (2012); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of 
Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1056–57 (1995).  
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For  
P E 
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B
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because of political pressure, such as legislative opposition if there is 
divided government. The political environment shifted for President 
Reagan, for example, when Ann Gorsuch—his first administrator of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—was forced to resign 
after being caught up in political scandal.11 The president was forced to 
appoint William Ruckelshaus, a former EPA administrator, who was 
committed to restoring EPA’s credibility and effectiveness.12 
In Figure 2, the position of the courts (J) and the president (P) are 
closer than in Figure 1 because it is more likely that judges will affirm 
the modification of a rule than it is they will accept its revocation, as 
Part II.B explains. Once again, the relative policy preferences of the 
other players can differ from those that are modeled in Figure 2. 
Regulatory beneficiaries, for example, may not be as opposed to the 
modification as Figure 2 indicates if the modification does not 
significantly reduce the protection available to them. Or the policy 
preference of regulated entities (E) may not be similar to that of the 
president because once again the costs of complying with the original 
rule may be largely sunk costs.  Depending on its political makeup, 
Congress (C) might have a policy preference that is closer or more 
remote from the preferences of the president and regulated entities. 
Despite these and other permutations, the important point is that the 
case law is relatively favorable to the modification of a rule, and it is 
more so for the revocation of a rule. By comparison, as we come to 
next, legal doctrine is even more favorable, as a general matter, to 
rulemaking inaction. 
 
Figure 2: Modify  
  
 
 
An agency’s decision not to adopt new protective regulations is 
likely to be a winning strategy in terms of judicial review, as Part II.C 
explains. Like the previous diagrams, Figure 3 captures common 
strategic preferences of the agency and interested parties, but these can 
shift in a number of circumstances. For example, judicial patience for 
 
 11. JONATHAN LASH, KATHERINE GILLMAN & DAVID SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS: 
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 81 (1st ed. 1984).  
 12. Daniel J. Fiorino, Streams of Environmental Innovation: Four Decades of EPA Policy 
Reform, 44 ENVTL. L. 723, 740 (2014).  
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the failure to respond to a petition may not be as generous if the 
petition was filed in a previous administration, and a significant amount 
of time has elapsed prior to a new administration taking control of an 
agency.13 Or an agency may decide to grant the petition and adopt a 
rule that is less stringent than a more zealous administration might 
adopt, as a tactic to raise the costs of replacing its rule in the new 
administration. All in all, none of the permutations belie the conclusion 
that judicial review is highly favorable to an administration that favors 
rulemaking inaction as a deregulatory strategy. 
 
Figure 3: Inaction  
  
 
II.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF DEREGULATION 
The previous description of an administration’s strategic choices 
identifies differences in the prospect of judicial acceptance of rule 
revocation, modification, and inaction. Put simply, the courts are the 
least likely to affirm the revocation of a rule and the most likely to 
accept rulemaking inaction. This claim is made with recognition that 
for many lawyers and scholars, such as Professors Gellhorn and 
Robinson some forty years ago, “the rules governing judicial review 
have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape.”14 Fair 
enough, but as Professor Schotland suggested, the scope of review at 
least establishes a “mood point[]” that forms the critical attitude with 
which a judge approaches an administrative decision.15 The law of 
inaction invites differing moods when it comes to revocation, 
modification, and inaction. 
An administration can engage in inaction either by failing to start 
any new proregulatory rulemakings or by stalling proregulatory rules 
that it inherited. When an agency has failed to start new rules, 
regulatory beneficiaries cannot sue the agency for its inaction. The 
Supreme Court has instead held that their only remedy is to file a 
rulemaking petition and then seek judicial review if an agency rejects 
 
 13. See infra Parts III.C.3–4 (arguing that judges should apply more rigorous review to 
rulemaking inaction). 
 14. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 771, 780 (1975).  
 15. Roy A. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action, 34 FED. B.J. 54, 59 (1975). 
E P B C 
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Against 
Preference 
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J 
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the petition or fails to respond in a timely manner. If an agency is slow 
walking a rule, regulatory beneficiaries can sue the agency over the 
delay. 
A. Revocation 
The mood when judges review the revocation of a rule is 
skepticism. As Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.16 established years ago, courts are to employ hard 
look review, which requires judges to determine if the rulemaking 
record supports the determination that a rule is not necessary to 
address the risk or problem established by an agency when it 
promulgated the rule in the first place.17 Unless the original agency was 
mistaken, or somehow circumstances have changed, it will be difficult 
for the revoking agency to overcome the previous rulemaking record. 
In State Farm, the Justices were unanimous that the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) had failed to 
explain its decision to drop the requirement that automobile 
manufacturers install air bags in cars. In fact, the NHTSA had not 
offered any explanation whatsoever.18 But a majority of the Court also 
found that the agency had failed to adequately explain revoking the 
requirement automobile manufacturers install automatic seatbelts 
because there was a discrepancy between this choice and some of the 
evidence buried in the rulemaking record.19 Whether or not a reviewing 
court will likewise scour the rulemaking record in other revocation 
cases, it is clear that the revoking agency must overcome the findings 
in the original rulemaking record that a rule—some rule—is necessary 
to protect the public, according to the agency’s mandate. 
Assuming that the agency originally had reliable evidence 
establishing that the rule addressed a risk to the public or some other 
need for regulatory protection, it will be necessary for the same agency 
to show that this finding was in error. Perhaps the agency earlier made 
a hash of its findings in this regard, but this seems unlikely if, as most 
often happens, the rule was affirmed on appeal after a court of appeals 
 
 16. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 17. Id. at 29, 42–44 (1983) (establishing that a judge must verify that an agency “examine[d] 
the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))). 
 18. Id. at 46 (“NHTSA apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying the 
Standard to require that airbag technology be utilized.”).  
 19. Id. at 54.  
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applied hard look review to affirm the agency’s claim that the rule was 
necessary to prevent some risk or harm. 
Alternatively, when the agency revokes the rule, it may claim that 
the previous agency regime lacked the legal authority to promulgate its 
rule. Again, since the original rule is in effect, it likely survived judicial 
review and a challenge to its legal authority to promulgate the rule if 
one was available to the plaintiff. 
Still, if the agency’s original rule prevailed at step two of Chevron, 
when it revokes the rule, the agency presumably could argue that its 
claim of lack of jurisdiction is also a plausible reading of its statutory 
authority.20 Assume, for example, that a court had affirmed the Clean 
Power Plant Rule promulgated in the Obama administration. The rule 
was based on a contested interpretation of EPA’s authority under the 
Clean Air Act.21 Arguably, a later administration could revoke the rule 
by reading the same statutory language as not empowering it to issue 
such a rule. The Supreme Court has held that a prior agency 
interpretation of a judicial ruling on the meaning of a provision is 
prohibited only if the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus makes no room 
for agency discretion.22 It is not clear how often this situation arises, but 
when it does, the revoking agency may be more successful in court than 
if its revocation is based on a claim that no risk or problem exists. 
B. Modification 
The mood when judges review the modification of a rule is more 
accommodating. As agencies can choose more than one regulatory 
policy that is not “arbitrary” and “capricious,”23 judges have the 
expectation that an agency can modify a rule by making a different set 
of calculations concerning which of several policy options it prefers. In 
other words, although judges apply hard look review to rulemaking 
modifications, judges expect that an agency can justify the withdrawal 
of a rule because the agency is not trying to overcome an earlier 
 
 20. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency 
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone . . . . [T]he agency . . . must consider varying 
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).  
 21. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 41–42 (2014). 
 22. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005); 
Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); see also United States v. 
Home Concrete & Supply, 566 U.S. 478, 486 (2012).  
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012).  
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rulemaking record that establishes some type of regulation is 
necessary. 
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,24 for example, the Court 
reviewed a decision by the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) concerning when a broadcaster violated a ban on “indecent 
broadcasts.”25 After Congress prohibited “indecent” broadcasts,26 the 
FCC adopted a policy that it would not hold broadcasters liable for 
“fleeting expletives.”27 Then, the FCC decided that, although it would 
not impose sanctions on the broadcasters, it would no longer allow a 
fleeting-expletive safe harbor.28 A majority of five Justices affirmed the 
new policy in a decision in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, who 
declared policy changes should not be subject to stricter review than 
the usual demand of a reasoned explanation.29 As he wrote, the agency 
need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the 
new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that 
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good 
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the 
conscious change of course adequately indicates.30 
Although Justice Kennedy voted to affirm the new policy, he 
joined the dissenting Justices in requiring an explanation why the 
agency chose to reject the first policy in favor of the second.31 So, five 
members of the Court decided that an agency must not only justify the 
new rule, but also must justify the change in rules.  
Even if this expectation does not survive in light of the new 
makeup of the Court,32 agencies should normally be able to meet this 
 
 24. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 25. Id. at 505–07. 
 26. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 
954 (1992) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2010)) (instructing the FCC to enforce a 
statutory ban on indecent broadcasts). 
 27. See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 508, 512 (explaining the evolution of agency 
policy). 
 28. Id. at 512–13.  
 29. Id. at 514. 
 30. Id. at 515 (emphasis in original). 
 31. Id. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that an 
agency making a policy change “must explain why ‘it now reject[s] the considerations that led it 
to adopt that initial policy’” (quoting id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 32. In Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), the Court remanded a policy 
change by an agency because it failed to offer an adequate explanation for its new policy. Id. at 
2126. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy neither cited Fox Television Stations nor did he 
mention that an agency must justify its later policy as better than the earlier one. See id. at 2125–
SHAPIRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:54 PM 
1816  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1805 
expectation. A later agency can reasonably disagree with the original 
choice, and, if so, it should be able to explain its difference of opinion 
when it justifies a modified rule. After all, the agency has reasons for 
preferring the new rule, and there is no reason to think agency lawyers 
cannot explain those reasons. 
C. Inaction 
A judge’s mood when reviewing agency inaction is that agency 
priority setting is above his or her pay grade. As a result, when 
compared to the revocation or modification of a rule, an agency can 
expect the courts will almost always permit inaction. As regulatory 
beneficiaries cannot sue agencies for inaction unless there is a 
mandatory duty to promulgate a regulation, which Congress seldom 
imposes, the only way to attack inaction is to petition an agency to 
promulgate a rule. A court, however, will apply extremely deferential 
review if an agency rejects a rulemaking petition out of respect for the 
agency’s need for priority setting. Alternatively, if an agency has not 
responded to a rulemaking petition, or if it has been slow in developing 
a rule, judges normally are unwilling to order the agency to take 
immediate action because of the difficulty in determining whether an 
agency has been acting in good faith. Intervention is therefore 
warranted only in cases where it is strikingly obvious that the refusal to 
work on a rule or start one cannot be justified as a matter of allowable 
administrative choice. 
1. Rulemaking Petitions.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,33 a plaintiff cannot sue an 
agency for inaction without first filing a petition requesting that action. 
In Norton, the plaintiff had sued the Department of Interior (“DOI”) 
for its failure to ban the use of off-road-vehicles (“ORV”) in wilderness 
study areas. The question before the Court was whether the judge 
could compel the DOI to act under its legislative mandate to protect 
such areas. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court’s answer was a 
resounding “no.” 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) is at the center of the 
Norton decision. It creates a cause of action to sue an agency for 
 
26 (describing the applicable legal doctrine). Since, however, the agency did not offer an adequate 
justification for its later rule, there was no necessity to discuss an agency’s obligation to defend 
the later rule as better than the earlier one.  
 33. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004).  
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persons “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute,”34 empowering regulatory beneficiaries 
to sue an agency to test the legality of the agency’s action. Although 
this suggests that a plaintiff can only sue if an agency does something 
(“aggrieved by agency action”), the APA oxymoronically defines 
“agency action” as including the “failure to act.”35 The plaintiff in 
Norton claimed the agency’s mandate required it to protect wilderness 
study areas from environmental deterioration, and environmentalists 
asserted the “use of ORVs on federal land has negative environmental 
consequences, including soil disruption and compaction, harassment of 
animals, and annoyance of wilderness lovers.”36 In Norton, the plaintiff 
therefore asked the Court to order the DOI to ban ORVs under the 
Court’s authority in the APA to “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld.”37 
The Court asserted that the agency’s failure to ban the vehicles 
was not “unlawfully withheld” because the agency did not have a 
mandatory duty to take this step. Although the Court agreed that the 
agency had been required by Congress to protect wilderness study 
areas, it found Congress had left it up to the agency to determine what 
steps were necessary to accomplish this goal.38 This interpretation was 
necessary, Justice Scalia explained, because when Congress adopted 
the APA, it intended to continue the traditional mandamus remedy as 
it existed prior to the APA.39 Under traditional mandamus, a court is 
only authorized to order a government official to take a specific action 
if Congress has mandated that action. Put simply, the Norton plaintiffs 
were asking the Court to do something it could not do. 
 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the interest 
it seeks to protect is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the statute . . . in 
question.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also Match-
E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012) (finding 
that a plaintiff was within the “zone of interest” because the plaintiff’s interests were not “so 
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit” (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. 
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)); Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 
498 U.S. 517, 524–28 (1991) (inquiring into the context of a statutory provision and its legislative 
history to determine that the plaintiff was not in the zone of interests). 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).  
 36. Norton, 542 U.S. at 60, 66. 
 37. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
 38. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 66. 
 39. See id. at 63. 
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What all of this means is a plaintiff is not entitled to relief unless 
an agency has a legal obligation to adopt a rule, which would be true 
only in two instances. First, if Congress has required an agency to 
promulgate a rule, which sometimes happens,40 a plaintiff can get relief 
if the agency has failed to do so. And second, the other possibility arises 
after the agency has denied a rulemaking petition. If the denial is not 
legally justified, a court can compel the agency to start a rulemaking 
process.41 But the courts apply a form of very deferential review when 
ruling on the legality of an agency’s decision to deny a rulemaking 
petition. 
2. Denial.  An agency is likely to prevail when there is a judicial 
challenge to its denial of a rulemaking petition because judicial review 
is “‘extremely limited’” and “‘highly deferential.’”42 As a typical 
statement of the scope of review indicates, “[a]s a general proposition, 
this court will compel an agency to institute rulemaking proceedings 
only in extremely rare instances.”43 Let’s call this “soft look” review.44 
Because review is a “soft look,” a court’s mood is to accept, at face 
value, a plausible explanation why an agency denied a rulemaking 
petition. A court will normally affirm the denial if, in a rulemaking 
petition, the agency claims it has limited resources and other 
priorities,45 a rule is unnecessary to address a regulatory problem,46 it 
lacks the scientific information to formulate a law,47 or that there is no 
significant regulatory problem to be addressed.48 
 
 40. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7615b(d) (requiring EPA to 
“promulgate, not later than 18 months after November 15, 1990, a system for issuing, recording, 
and tracking [the] allowances [that authorize emissions of acid rain precursors], which shall 
specify all necessary procedures and requirements for an orderly and competitive functioning of 
the allowance system”).  
 41. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act 
permits review of EPA’s rejection of a rulemaking petition).  
 42. Id. at 527–28 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am. v. United 
States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 43. Ark. Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 725 F.2d 716, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 44. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1032, 1055 (2011) (noting that “‘hard look’ review can become ‘soft look’ review or even a 
rubber stamp for agency decisionmaking”).  
 45. See, e.g., Wildearth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Defs. of 
Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008); UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 255–56 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  
 46. See, e.g., Compassion Over Killing v. FDA, 849 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 47. In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 830 F.2d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 48. See, e.g., Compassion Over Killing, 849 F.3d at 857 (finding that the FDA had broad 
discretion to enforce on a case-by-case basis rather than promulgating regulations where the 
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Under soft look review, “[f]ederal courts rarely conduct 
meaningful judicial review of agency inaction.”49 Two reasons explain 
the credulous nature of judicial review. First, lacking a rulemaking 
record, it is difficult for a plaintiff to contest the agency explanation. 
Since “hard look” review requires a judge to assess the agency’s 
justification in light of the rulemaking record, looking for discrepancies 
or oversights,50 soft look review reflects the lack of a record to conduct 
hard look review. The record before a court consists of the plaintiff’s 
rulemaking petition and the agency’s letter or notice denying the 
petition, which gives a plaintiff only a limited opportunity to point to 
facts that overcome the agency’s claims.51 
Second, soft look review of rulemaking petitions reflects judicial 
attitudes about agency priority setting and the interests of regulatory 
beneficiaries. Because a rulemaking petition effectively attempts to 
trump agency priority setting, judges have been sympathetic to an 
administration’s prerogative—having won the election—to determine 
how to use agency resources. More broadly, since the agency is doing 
nothing, it is a matter of “no harm, no foul.” That regulatory 
beneficiaries have a type of legal right to be protected simply does not 
enter the judicial equation. 
To be sure, however, agencies are not given carte blanche 
authority to reject a rulemaking petition. Thus, the courts will overrule 
the denial of a rulemaking petition when an agency erroneously claims 
it lacks the legal authority to start the requested rulemaking.52 
Likewise, the agency is likely to lose the case if its explanation is not 
facially credible in light of the claims in the rulemaking petition.53 
 
agency decided to prioritize other projects); Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Sec’y of Veterans 
Affairs, 815 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 632 F.3d 1345, 
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 49. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1381 (2013). 
 50. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 51. The situation changes, however, when an agency declines to issue a rule after it completes 
the rulemaking record. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Res. Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1159 
(D.C. Cir. 1983). As the court explained in Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, there is a 
difference “between an agency’s refusal to undertake a rulemaking (reviewable, if at all, under 
an exceedingly narrow standard), and its decision to terminate a docket after a substantial record 
has been compiled.” 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989). At the end of the rulemaking process, the 
court noted, it had “a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining whether the Commission’s 
ultimate decision was arbitrary and capricious or in contravention of the statute.” Id.  
 52. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).  
 53. See, e.g., Flyers Rights Educ. Fund v. FAA, 864 F.3d 738, 744–45 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
SHAPIRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:54 PM 
1820  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1805 
Finally, according to Massachusetts v. EPA,54 an agency cannot justify 
its denial based on reasons unrelated to its statutory mission.55 The last 
limitation is discussed in more detail in Part III.A. 
All things considered, administrative law is more favorable to an 
agency’s decision to deny a rulemaking petition than it is to judicial 
review of a rulemaking modification or withdrawal. While review is not 
toothless, it is not searching, either. An agency might trip over its own 
feet in justifying the denial of a rulemaking petition, but agencies 
should be able to avoid this outcome in most cases by careful legal and 
policy work. If not, why make dubious argument when an agency can 
go years without answering it as the next Section indicates? 
3. No Response.  An agency has an obligation under the APA to 
respond to a rulemaking petition within a “reasonable” amount of 
time,56 and this requirement is judicially enforceable.57 What is 
reasonable is not defined, and most courts use the multi-factor analysis 
established in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC58 
(“TRAC”) to assess “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to 
warrant mandamus.”59 But the factors are not particularly helpful in 
determining the reasonableness of a delay because their comparative 
importance has never been established; moreover, it is unclear how 
many of the factors are necessary to find a delay has been 
 
 54. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 55. See id. at 533. 
 56. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012) (establishing an agency’s duty “within a reasonable time . . . to 
conclude a matter presented to it” (emphasis added)). 
 57. Section 706(1) of the APA authorizes a court to “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (emphasis added). Section 551(13) defines 
“agency action” to include “failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).  
 58. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 59. Id. at 79. The TRAC case developed the factors as a summation of considerations that 
had been used in other cases to determine whether a delay was unreasonable within the meaning 
of the APA. According to this summary:  
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”; 
(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme 
may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the 
sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at 
stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency 
activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account 
the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not 
“find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency 
action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’”  
Id. at 80 (citations omitted) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 
(D.C. Cir. 1983)). 
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unreasonable.60 Furthermore, although one of the factors is whether 
Congress has established a deadline to respond to a petition,61 the 
courts are split whether the deadline is mandatory or precatory.62 At 
the end of the day, judges “can use the TRAC analysis to support 
virtually any conclusion they want to reach.”63 
Using this test, judges are inclined to accept an agency’s excuse 
that “it is too busy,” at least until enough years pass that this excuse no 
longer appears credible.64 Judges are in an accommodating mood 
because they are in no position to assess the relative priorities of all the 
things the agency does. Perhaps the agency’s explanation is in good 
faith and perhaps it is not.  Although an agency may be acting 
strategically when it makes this claim, it is also possible that the claims 
are in good faith. If, for example, a petition asks EPA to promulgate a 
rule under the Clean Air Act to reduce ambient exposure to a chemical 
because it is pollutant, the agency must investigate the scientific and 
other evidence needed to make this complex determination. And then 
it must determine whether the risk to the people and the environment 
is greater than from other pollutants that the agency is currently 
regulating or may regulate in the future. All of this must be done while 
the agency balances its other commitments and accounts for the 
resources available to it in these days of shrinking agency budgets.65 
 
 60. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 6, at 1412. 
 61. Id. at 1411. 
 62. Compare In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (“Our conclusion that the Secretary has violated the deadline set forth in the Mine Act does 
not end the analysis. . . . [W]e must continue our analysis of the remaining TRAC factors to 
determine whether mandamus is appropriate in this case.”), with Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 
F.3d 1178, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen an entity governed by the APA fails to comply with 
a statutorily imposed absolute deadline, it has unlawfully withheld agency action and courts, upon 
proper application, must compel the agency to act.”).  
 63. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 6, at 1413. 
 64. See, e.g., In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
six-year delay in issuing a justification for a rule after the rule was remanded without vacation was 
unreasonable); In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419–20 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(identifying that a failure to respond to rulemaking petition in six-plus years is unreasonable); In 
re United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d at 551–54 (noting that the court ordered an agency to produce 
timetable for promulgating final rule after an eight-year delay); Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 
1193 (finding a four-year delay in promulgating a rule to be unreasonable in light of one-year 
statutory deadline for promulgation); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 
629 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that a five-year delay in promulgating a final rule “treads at the very 
lip of the abyss of unreasonable delay”).  
 65. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO 
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO 
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 65–67 (2010) (documenting budget cuts at health 
and safety agencies). 
SHAPIRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:54 PM 
1822  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1805 
Thus, in an APA irony, an agency can “respond to a petition for 
rulemaking designed to remedy indefinite agency delay with more 
indefinite agency delay.”66 For any agency with a deregulatory agenda, 
current doctrine offers an opportunity to delay a response for much of 
an entire administration, if not the whole four years. Even when a court 
begins to doubt that the agency’s justification is valid, it will 
nonetheless ask the agency to develop a schedule for responding, 
rather than order it to do so, a result that buys the agency even more 
time.67 Though this remedy eventually forces an agency to cough up a 
response, it also offers the agency more time to delay as part of a 
deregulatory strategy. 
4. A Slow Walk.  Agencies in a new presidential administration 
will inherit some rules that were started by their predecessors. An 
agency committed to deregulation has two options for existing rules in 
the pipeline. It can withdraw them from the rulemaking, but as 
indicated previously, this strategy may not be successful if the agency 
has already developed a rulemaking record. Or it can slow down the 
development of existing regulatory rules to the average speed of an 
tortoise,68 which pretty much guarantees that nothing will happen for 
several years.69 
Courts will evaluate claims of unreasonable delay in the 
completion of a rule in light of the extent of the delay, the nature of the 
agency’s statutory mandate, the consequences of the delay, and the 
validity of the agency’s reasons why it is taking so long.70 Once again, 
the vagueness of these factors and the failure to decide the significance 
of each factor as compared to the others allows judges to accept even 
long delays if they are so inclined. And they are. Judges have the same 
reluctance to interfere with how an agency balances its priorities and 
resources concerning the development of existing rules as they do 
 
 66. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Constraining White House Political Control of 
Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1457, 
1487 (2015). 
 67. See Nat’l Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 891 
(D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating 
that “[t]he courts cannot responsibly mandate flat guideline deadlines when the Administrator 
demonstrates that additional time is necessary” to ensure compliance with the statute). 
 68. Jacob Reis, How Fast Does A Turtle Run?, CUTENESS, https://www.cuteness.com/article/
how-fast-does-turtle-run [https://perma.cc/R7YA-CCTZ] (“While the average turtle can only 
‘run’ 3 or 4 mph, there are some who are much slower.”).  
 69. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 70. See In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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concerning the failure to respond to a rulemaking petition.71 Even if a 
court finds that a delay has been unreasonable, or that at least borders 
on the unreasonable, the court will likely order the agency to establish 
a timetable for completion of the regulation.72 But even then, the court 
may allow the agency to extend the earlier deadlines.73 
III.  ENHANCED ACCOUNTABILITY 
The process of judicial review is the most likely to accept 
deregulation by rulemaking inaction, less likely to accept the 
modification of rules, and the least likely to accept the revocation of a 
rule. While this asymmetry allows judges to avoid potential 
interference with agency priority setting, it does so at the cost of 
enabling the strategic use of rulemaking inaction as a tool of 
deregulation. Accordingly, when it comes to establishing 
accountability for using rulemaking inaction as deregulation, 
administrative law in effect defers to electoral politics to provide that 
accountability. 
There are two significant problems with this judicial surrender. 
First, it abandons the traditional role of administrative law in 
legitimizing agency action by constraining the operation of politics 
within the rulemaking process, and electoral accountability, which 
exists more in theory than in practice, does not make up for this 
shortfall. Second, even if the president is accountable at some broad 
level for the policies of his administration, he enjoys considerable 
insulation that shields him from observation by many voters when he 
acts to deregulate. As a result, when a deregulatory administration 
takes office, there may be no effective check on the strategic use of 
rulemaking inaction as a deregulatory strategy. 
Because of these defects, the courts should abandon their overly 
deferential judicial review of rulemaking inaction. A less deferential 
 
 71. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“Distilled to its essence, this petition . . . would have us intrude into the quintessential discretion 
of the Secretary of Labor to allocate OSHA’s resources and set its priorities.”); Pub. Citizen 
Health Research Grp. v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“This court should intervene 
to override agency priorities and timetables only in the most egregious of cases.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 72. See, e.g., In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d at 1150; Oil, Chem. & Atomic 
Workers Int’l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
 73. See, e.g., Nat’l Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 
888 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[T]he timetables . . . are not etched in stone . . . [and] the Secretary has 
authority to delay development of a standard . . . .”). 
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approach need not unduly intrude on agency priority setting, and even 
if that cost cannot be entirely avoided, more aggressive review is 
justified by the courts’ obligation to review political interference with 
an agency’s responsibility to protect the public. 
A. Legal Civics 
The courts’ use of uber-deference to review rulemaking inaction 
is a judicial abandonment of the traditional role of administrative law 
of legitimizing agency action by constraining the operation of politics. 
The origin of this obligation is the judiciary’s role in our constitutional 
system of ensuring the rule of law, which in this context requires 
implementing Congress’ commitment to protect the public and the 
environment as an agency’s statutory mandate requires. 
Administrative law has long been the way we try to fit the “‘round 
peg’ of administrative government into the ‘square hole’ of the nation’s 
constitutional culture.”74 Because the attributes of modern 
administrative government are missing from basic constitutional 
design, we have been on a decades-long effort to reinterpret our legal 
culture to accommodate positive government on a massive scale.75 The 
contribution of administrative law to this effort was captured by Frank 
Newman’s observation that administrative law is “‘Legal’ Civics, no 
more, no less.”76 At bottom, the obligation that an agency must act 
consistently with its statutory mandates is what makes administrative 
law into “legal” civics. 
Despite the difficulty of verifying this consistency with vague and 
ambiguous legislative mandates, the process of verification legitimizes 
agency action by associating it with a democratic act—the enactment 
of a law. It may well be the situation that Congress, by using vague and 
ambiguous language, has delegated to agencies a generous policy space 
in which to operate. The question is not whether the agency is carrying 
out the intent of Congress, which cannot be fully determined. Rather, 
it is whether the agency is acting within the confines of its delegation. 
If so, judicial confirmation makes the agency action democratic, as 
well. 
 
 74. Sidney A. Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, 5 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: 
THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 3 (2005).  
 75. For an overview of this history, see generally JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND 
LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978).  
 76. WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 
xvii (6th ed. 1974) (quoting Professor Frank C. Newman).  
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On one hand, both State Farm and Massachusetts v. EPA 
confirmed that administrative law is legal civics by interpreting the 
relevant statutory mandates as floors of obligation to protect statutory 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, the Court’s endorsement of extreme 
deference in the review of agency action in Massachusetts v. EPA belies 
this commitment. 
When the Supreme Court reviewed NHTSA’s decision to revoke 
a protective rule, it insisted that it offer “a satisfactory explanation for 
its action including ‘a rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made.’”77 The Court therefore placed a floor on 
deregulation by requiring that an agency be able to justify a rule 
revocation as consistent with its duty to protect people or the 
environment. 
This is not all. The Court refused to credit that NHTSA was 
fulfilling a campaign promise of President Reagan. It did not matter to 
the Court that NHTSA was responding to President’ Reagan’s efforts 
to bring regulatory relief to the automobile industry, one of his 
prominent campaign promises.78 By requiring the agency to justify its 
revocation as consistent with its statutory mandate, the Court instead 
endorsed the traditional role of administrative law as a constraint on 
politics. 
Finally, but hardly least of all, the Court rejected the idea that 
deregulatory actions are entitled to more judicial deference because 
they remove government restrictions on people or property. Prior to 
the State Farm decision, a range of “litigants and commentators . . . 
argued that [the courts] should review deregulation less [vigorously] 
than they” review the promulgation of a new rule.79 To the contrary, 
according to the Court, “[i]f Congress established a presumption from 
which judicial review should start, that presumption—contrary to 
petitioners’ views—is not against safety regulation, but against changes 
in current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record.”80 
Two aspects of Massachusetts v. EPA are noteworthy regarding 
legal civics. First, the Court again explicitly rejected compliance with 
presidential preferences as a justification for inaction when those 
 
 77. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 78. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration and 
Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 188 (2017).  
 79. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 513 
(1985).  
 80. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (emphasis in original).  
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preferences do not relate to an agency’s obligation to protect people or 
the environment. And second, it refused to extend the presumption 
against judicial review of enforcement decisions to agency decisions 
not to regulate. This underlined that the courts must have a role in 
protecting the interests of regulatory beneficiaries concerning 
rulemaking inaction. Unfortunately, the Court did not recognize the 
inconsistency of highly deferential review with this commitment. 
The petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA had filed a rulemaking 
petition asking EPA to regulate the emission of four greenhouse gases 
using its authority under the Clean Air Act.81 After EPA rejected the 
petition, the Court reversed because EPA “offered no reason[ed] 
explanation” of its denial.82 EPA had argued that it lacked the legal 
jurisdiction for such a regulation, but the Court found no legal basis to 
uphold that claim.83 As an alternative, EPA offered “a laundry list of 
reasons not to regulate,” but the Court objected that EPA’s “reasons 
for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute.”84 
The Court noted that EPA claimed that if it regulated it “might 
impair the President’s ability to negotiate with ‘key developing nations’ 
to reduce emissions,” and that regulation would “reflect ‘an inefficient, 
piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue.’”85 The 
problem with these reasons, the Court stated, is that “they have 
nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to 
climate change,”86 a determination that EPA was required by statute 
to make.87 
By its decision, the Court was enforcing both a ceiling and a floor 
that cabined EPA’s policymaking space. Just as EPA could not exceed 
the legal authority delegated by Congress, it also could not avoid its 
statutory obligation except for priority setting related to its mission to 
protect people and the environment. 
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the Court could 
not have intended the offered reading because it would prohibit an 
agency from justifying the denial of a petition on resource grounds.88 It 
 
 81. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007). 
 82. Id. at 534. 
 83. Id. at 528–32. 
 84. Id. at 533. 
 85. Id. (citations omitted). 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 532–33. 
 88. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 170.  
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is not evident, however, why agencies are restricted in this way. 
Although Congress has tasked an agency with an affirmative obligation 
to implement the protections it has identified in its mandate, surely it 
also understood that agencies will have to make choices in terms of 
priority setting. As Shep Melnik has noted, agencies “are almost always 
given huge, even utopian, goals and are then saddled with a large 
number of constraints that prevent them from achieving these goals 
efficiently—or even at all.”89 Congress, for example, has ordered EPA 
to “maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters,”90 to ensure waters are fishable and swimmable,91 and 
to terminate discharge of pollutants.92 Only legislators willfully 
ignorant of bureaucratic realities could expect that EPA could fulfill 
those goals all at once as opposed to through a gradual, steady 
progress. 
Moreover, legitimate priority setting can be in service of that 
agency mandate. As agencies have limited resources, they are likely to 
be more successful in protecting people and the environment by 
working on a limited number of rules than indiscriminately working on 
more rules and not advancing any of them. The choice, then, inevitably 
involves considering resource limitations, legal constraints, and the 
agency’s political environment. The problem with rulemaking inaction 
is not that agencies defend it as a matter of priority setting. The 
problem is that judicial review makes little or no effort to verify that 
the reasons cited by the agency are not a fig leaf for a strategy of 
deregulation. 
A second aspect of Massachusetts v. EPA also endorses the role of 
administrative law as a constraint on politics. After Heckler v. 
Chaney,93 it was unclear for a time whether the presumption against 
judicial review of “enforcement” decisions created in the case included 
judicial review of an agency’s decision to reject a rulemaking petition. 
Although the priority setting decisions made concerning enforcement 
and the rejection of a rulemaking petition require similar assessments 
of agency priorities, the Court recognized that the rulemaking situation 
 
 89. R. Shep Melnick, The Political Roots of the Judicial Dilemma, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 585, 
586 (1997). 
 90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 91. Id. § 1251(a)(1).  
 92. Id. § 1251(a)(2).  
 93. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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was different because regulatory beneficiaries have a statutory right to 
protection under an agency’s mandate. 
Heckler declined to review the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(“FDA”) rejection of a petition from prisoners on death row asking the 
agency to use its enforcement powers to stop the use of drugs for lethal 
injections to carry out the death penalty.94 The plaintiffs had argued 
that the FDA’s statutory mandate required it to act, but the Court 
rejected their argument by calling on a presumption against judicial 
review of agency enforcement actions.95 
Some of the reasons the Court cited for a presumption against 
review of enforcement decisions could just as easily apply to judicial 
review of the rejection of a rulemaking petition. Judicial review of 
enforcement priorities was “unsuitab[le]” because these decisions 
“often involve[d] a complicated balancing of a number of factors which 
are peculiarly within [an agency’s] expertise”96 and because a decision 
not to prosecute does not involve the government’s “exercise [of] its 
coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights.”97 The 
same might be said concerning the rejection of a rulemaking petition. 
The rejection, in a broad sense, is a decision about how best to 
“enforce” an agency’s legislative mandate. And like a decision not to 
prosecute, the rejection of a rulemaking petition does not involve the 
government’s use of its coercive power. 
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did not share this view, 
however. It distinguished the two situations in this way: 
In contrast to nonenforcement decisions, agency refusals to initiate 
rulemaking ‘are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to 
factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public 
explanation.’ They moreover arise out of denials of petitions for 
 
 94. Id. at 837–38. 
 95. Id. at 836. The Court attributed the presumption to Congress on the ground that when it 
passed the Administrative Procedure Act legislators were aware of the long tradition of 
prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 832 (“[W]e believe that the Congress enacting the APA did not 
intend to alter that tradition” of agency discretion.). 
 96. Id. at 831.  
 97. Id. at 832 (emphasis in original). The Court also found that there was no “focus for 
judicial review” because, unlike in enforcement decisions, the agency did not “exercise[] its power 
in some manner.” Id. The fourth reason was that an agency’s decision not to take an enforcement 
action was similar to that of a “prosecutor . . . not to indict—a decision which has long been 
regarded as the special providence of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who 
is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” Id. (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
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rulemaking which (at least in the circumstances here) the affected 
party had an undoubted procedural right to file in the first instance.98  
Yet, the Court did not explain how these factual differences were 
related to the rationale in Heckler. Put differently, why does the 
balance shift in favor of judicial review in light of these differences? 
It may be that the Court was saying that an agency requires more 
discretion when making enforcement decisions than in decisions about 
rulemaking petitions, given the differences that the Court identified.99 
But the Court also mentions that these cases “arise out of denials of 
petitions for rulemaking which (at least in the circumstances here) the 
affected party had an undoubted procedural right to file in the first 
instance.”100 In other words, Congress gave regulatory beneficiaries the 
right to petition for protection, and as the Court went on to say in its 
opinion, the agency has an obligation to provide that protection unless 
it can give acceptable reasons why it cannot do so.101 
At the same time, while it did not immunize rulemaking inaction 
decisions from judicial review, the Court continued the extreme 
deference that is used in rulemaking inaction cases.102 Its recognition 
that enforcement and rulemaking inaction decisions involve priority 
setting led it to this unfortunate compromise. Litigants can sue 
regarding inaction, but agencies are entitled to extreme deference. But, 
as established earlier, this review is essentially no review at all.103 Thus, 
by default, the Court left regulatory beneficiaries with political 
accountability as the sole protection of their interests. This is, as it turns 
out, little to no protection in administrations that use rulemaking 
inaction as a deregulatory strategy. 
Some readers might object that inaction is not really a 
deregulatory strategy because, after all, there is no revocation or 
modification of an existing regulation. Once you consider that 
Congress establishes both a floor and ceiling when it adopts a 
regulatory mandate, however, inaction is properly considered 
deregulation. Congress has obligated an agency to act to protect the 
 
 98. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 99. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 96–97 (2007) (suggesting that the differences were related to 
“worry that agencies must have discretion to allocate resources on cost-benefit grounds”).  
 100. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527. 
 101. See id. at 534 (finding that EPA “offered no reasoned explanation” for its rejection). 
 102. Id. at 527–28. 
 103. See supra Part II.C (discussing the very deferential review applied by courts in the rare 
instances that plaintiffs are entitled to relief).  
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public. It has not been indifferent between regulating and not 
regulating. When an agency fails to regulate, it is defying its legislative 
mandate, and that act is properly considered deregulatory unless the 
agency can establish that it has higher priorities in terms of protecting 
people and the environment. 
B. “The Unbearable Lightness”104 of Political Accountability 
State Farm and Massachusetts v. EPA create an expectation that 
an agency’s refusal to regulate must be defended as consistent with its 
statutory mandate. Whatever has motivated an agency, including 
presidential preferences, the agency must justify its actions as 
consistent with its statutory mandate. Priority setting is a legitimate 
aspect of that mandate. Although agencies have an obligation to 
protect regulatory beneficiaries, that mandate is facilitated when 
agencies make reasonable choices as to how best to implement it. 
The challenge for the courts concerning rulemaking inaction is 
how to verify that an agency has made reasonable choices concerning 
priority setting. Under the current approach, the courts make no 
serious effort to determine whether agencies’ claims about priority 
setting are reasonable. The court’s use of uber-deference takes them 
entirely out of the picture as an agent of accountability. 
This defection results in a default to presidential accountability to 
protect regulatory beneficiaries. For some scholars, this defection is 
appropriate. They contend an agency should be able to rely on 
presidential preferences as part of its justification for an action.105 
According to this argument, because the president is accountable to 
the electorate, the legitimacy of administrative law is thus 
strengthened, not weakened.106 In addition, they justify judicial 
 
 104. With a nod to MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (1984).  
 105. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 192 (1990) (contending that courts should “credit politics as an 
acceptable and even desirable element of decision making”); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a 
Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2009) (proposing that 
courts should accept certain “political influences” in favor of a rule’s validity so long as they “are 
openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record”). See generally Nina A. 
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 
(2010) (documenting presidential supervision of agencies and resulting changes in agency rules 
while arguing for greater transparency of this influence). 
 106. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001) 
(proposing that courts relax hard look review if “demonstrable evidence shows that the President 
has taken an active role in, and by so doing has accepted responsibility for, [an] administrative 
decision”). 
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recognition of presidential preferences as consistent with 
constitutional arrangements that put the president is charge of the 
federal government.107 
Other scholars object that this move would weaken the traditional 
role of administrative law in legitimizing agency regulatory action. 
Specifically, their animating concern is that it would result in 
constraining the operation of politics within the rulemaking process.108 
They also doubt the efficacy of presidential accountability to prevent 
the president from doing the bidding of special interest groups in 
supervising agency action.109 
Concerns about presidential accountability are well founded for 
three reasons. First, as the political science literature warns us, the 
actions of elected officials are often hidden from voters, a condition 
that is described as “slack.”110 When elected officials have slack, this 
invisibility allows them to avoid electoral control by voters and do the 
bidding of special interest groups to the detriment of their 
constituents.111 Unsurprisingly, “the president has the incentive and 
 
 107. The unitary executive “allocates the power of law execution and administration to the 
President alone.” Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549 (1994). As result, even if Congress has expressly delegated 
rulemaking authority to an agency, the president can decide issues regarding the timing or 
substance of rulemaking. See id. at 581–82.  
 108. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144–45 (2012) (taking the position that “although politics may 
be a legitimate motivation for agency regulation, it should be irrelevant to judicial review of that 
regulation”). See generally Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: 
Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811 (2012) (rejecting political reason-giving 
models for reform). 
 109. See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative 
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852, 898–99 (2012) (objecting to the courts giving positive weight to 
political reasons in arbitrary and capricious review because it undermines electoral 
accountability).  
 110. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 167, 185 (1990) (defining “slack”). The 
authors explain: 
High information, monitoring and organization costs create “slack,” which shields 
officials from accountability to the general polity. Members of the general polity 
ordinarily do not have an incentive to learn issues well enough to comprehend their 
impact or to monitor and discipline the behavior of all those officials whose acts might 
affect them. This slack can be used by a regulator or her political sponsor to pursue 
officeholding self-interest . . . by pursuing regulatory policies that benefit special 
interests.  
Id.  
 111. Id. at 176–77; Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic 
Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 282–84 (1984) (observing that any “slack” given to 
political representatives can result in behavior that is independent of their constituents’ 
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ability to hide” actions taken at the behest of special interest groups.112 
But, even if voters have some idea about the president’s tactics, it 
seems farfetched that many would understand the strategic use of 
rulemaking inaction as a tool of deregulation, and in particular, how 
inaction can delay the adoption of protective rules for years and 
years.113 
Second, even if voters cop on to a president’s tactics, they will have 
to wait until the next election to correct a president’s commitment to 
inaction, which can postpone protective actions by five or more 
additional years even after a pro-protective president is elected.114 In a 
president’s second term, electoral accountability is even more 
attenuated, making it, to the extent it does exist, a weak protection of 
the interests of regulatory beneficiaries. It is well established that 
Americans can pay a high price for that delay, both in dollars and lost 
lives.115 
Finally, it is not clear that voters will be able to hold a president 
accountable in light of dysfunction in the political system, such as the 
electoral college, campaign finance laws that permit unlimited 
contributions by the wealthy, political gerrymandering, and voter 
irrationality which can give the upper hand to interests opposed to 
government regulation. Because of the electoral college, a nominee can 
 
accountability). 
 112. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 NYU L. REV. 461, 506 (2003).  
 113. It is true that if a president campaigns on promising less regulation, voters will have this 
information, but voters’ capacity to understand and process the information is likely to be limited 
as explained above.  
 114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., CATHERINE O’NEILL, AMY SINDEN, RENA STEINZOR, JAMES GOODWIN & 
LING-YEE HUANG ET AL., THE HIDDEN HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF 
REGULATORY DELAY 1 (2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CostofDelay_907.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8ZNT-GRGT] (discussing how “[e]ach year dozens of workers are killed, 
thousands of children harmed, and millions of dollars wasted because of unjustifiable delays in 
federal regulatory action.”); Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in 
the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (finding that “as a result of 
the cost and delay imposed by the regulatory approval process, thousands of potential new drug 
beneficiaries would die or unnecessarily suffer”); Ruth Ruttenberg, Jonathan Cardi & Estye 
Fenton, The Taxpayers’ Burden from Product-Related Harm, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 121 
(2011) (noting that “[h]undreds of billions of dollars are spent every year in the public sector as a 
result of death, injury, and illness associated with products”); Sidney Shapiro, Ruth Ruttenberg 
& Paul Leigh, The Social Costs of Dangerous Products: An Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775 (2009) (calculating empirical estimates of the costs to consumers of product 
and other injuries that are not prevented). 
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win the presidency and still lose the popular vote,116 an anomaly that 
can prevent the majority of Americans from holding a president 
accountable for the president’s deregulatory policies.117 After Citizens 
United,118 the capacity of wealthier Americans and corporations to 
spend unlimited amounts of money to support a president committed 
to deregulation increases their influence over the political process.119 
Political gerrymandering can distort the election of members of 
Congress, allowing the  party of a deregulatory president to control the 
House of Representatives despite losing the national vote for members 
of the House.120 Finally, the opponents of a president who engages in 
deregulation must overcome the irrationality of voters that can lead 
 
 116. President George W. Bush, for example, was elected president by the Electoral College 
on a vote of 271 to 266 although his opponent, Al Gore, won 51 percent of the popular vote.  2000 
Presidential Electoral and Popular Vote, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Dec., 2001), 
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm [https://perma.cc/27ZY-ZH3Q]. More 
recently, President Donald Trump received 304 votes to Hillary Clinton’s 227 votes in the 
electoral college, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, OFFICIAL 2016 GENERAL ELECTION VOTES 1 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
SYX2-CPWK], although Clinton received almost three million more votes in the popular 
election.  Id. at 2, 6; Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 
2017, 9:00 AM ET), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/ 
RM5C-EQK8.  
 117. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST. 
COMMENT. 143, 143, 145 (1995) (noting that “dreaded specter of a clear popular loser becoming 
the electoral college winner” is a “constitutional accident waiting to happen”); John B. Anderson, 
The Electoral College Flunks the Test in an Age of Democracy, AM. B. ASS’N: HUM. RTS. MAG. 
(June 30, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_ 
magazine_home/human_rights_vol32_2005/spring2005/hr_spring05_college [https://perma.cc/ 
KR8P-GCJN] (calling for “[d]irect democracy . . . at home within the borders of the American 
republic”). 
 118. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 119. See Tim Bakken, Constitutional Rights and Political Power of Corporations After Citizens 
United: The Decline of Citizens and the Rise of Foreign Corporations and Super PACs, 12 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 119, 120 (2013) (concluding that “Citizens United creates 
immense additional corporate influence over the U.S. political process”); Robert Weissman, 
Commentary, Let the People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional Amendment to Remove 
Corporate Speech From the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 979, 995 (2011) 
(observing, based on empirical information, that Citizens United “empowered a tiny number of 
organizations, relying on a tiny number of corporate and superwealthy contributors—many 
hidden behind a veil of secrecy—to raise and spend huge sums of money and exert a very 
substantial impact on the campaigns”). 
 120. See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 77, 112 (1985) (finding the invidious discrimination “against the candidates of a political 
party is to effectively disenfranchise the voters who support the positions espoused by that party’s 
candidates, to dilute the importance of their views in the halls of the legislature”); Richard E. 
Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 392–93 (2016) 
(demonstrating how, as a result of gerrymandering, the Republican party can win more seats in 
the House of Representatives despite winning less than 50 percent of the national vote).  
SHAPIRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2019  3:54 PM 
1834  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:1805 
them to favor polices like deregulation even though the voters are 
disadvantaged by the policy.121 Not for nothing did Winston Churchill 
observe “it has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time . . . .”122 
Realistic appraisal of electoral accountability leads to the 
conclusion that presidents can use deregulation to reward regulated 
entities and their supporters for their political support, despite the fact 
that the president is elected by and represents the entire nation. As 
Lisa Schultz Bressman has pointed out, “[a]sserting that the President 
is more immune to factional pressure than Congress because of his 
national constituency only asserts that [he] is immune in a relative 
sense” and “serious questions exist as to whether the President is 
immune at all.”123 
To be fair, scholars who would allow agencies to defend their 
actions based on presidential preferences are not completely trusting 
of electoral accountability. Katheryn Watts, for example, has proposed 
that courts should be more inclined to defer to an agency policy choice 
where the agency’s reasons for that choice include “the president 
wanted us to do this.”124 At the same time, she would have courts reject 
agency reasons that reflect “raw politics or partisan politics.”125 
As noted, administrative law has not chosen this path.126 Agencies 
can consider presidential preferences, but they still must “come up with 
reasoned justifications that can theoretically stand on their own 
regardless of which political actors might favor them.”127 This 
traditional administrative limitation on politics respects the idea that 
 
 121. See Sherman J. Clark, Commentary, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 434, 476 (1998) (observing the “[p]otentially troubling . . . near-certainty that there 
are many issues voters do not understand well, or perhaps do not even realize are being decided”); 
Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & Slavisa Tasic, Behaviroal Public Choice and the Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 
199, 212 (2015) (noting that “irrationality opens up an opportunity for politicians, bureaucrats, 
and special interest groups to take advantage of voters” because “[i]rrational voters may not 
rationally discount propaganda and other appeals to emotion, making them susceptible to 
deceptive forms of persuasion”). 
 122. The Worst Form of Government, INT’L CHURCHILL SOC’Y, https://winstonchurchill.org/
resources/quotes/the-worst-form-of-government [https://perma.cc/V35F-U8FT]. 
 123. Bressman, supra note 112, at 504. 
 124. Watts, supra note 105, at 8–9.  
 125. Id. at 9. 
 126. See supra Part III.A (describing the courts’ focus on agencies’ compliance with their 
regulatory mandate while declining to credit political factors).  
 127. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 66, at 1474.  
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the president, as much as an agency, is bound by the law—an agency’s 
statutory mandate. And it still permits agencies to follow presidential 
preferences, but they must establish that they are acting consistent with 
an agency’s mandate to protect the public or the environment. 
Sunstein and Vermeule have also proposed that the courts 
consider presidential preferences. But their proposal would allow the 
courts to take into consideration presidential preferences unrelated to 
an agency’s statutory mandate in certain circumstances.128 Under their 
proposed “anti-circumvention principle,” an agency could not reject a 
rulemaking petition if it would circumvent express or implied 
congressional instructions by deferring agency action.129 This limitation 
is necessary, they contend, to prevent “decisions not to decide, or to 
defer decisions” from becoming “a license for agencies to circumvent 
policy choices that Congress was entitled to make and did make, solely 
on the invalid ground that the agency disagrees with those policy 
choices.”130 If, however, Congress has issued no such instructions, 
Sunstein and Vermeule would continue the uber-deference that the 
courts use in reviewing an agency’s justifications for rulemaking 
inaction,131 and they would accept reasons that do not relate to the 
agency’s statutory mandate, which would include presidential 
preferences.132 
My objection to these proposals is that they constitute a 
fundamental break from the role of administrative law in constraining 
politics. Specifically, it permits the courts to defer to presidential 
preferences unrelated to an agency’s mandate as long as such 
preferences do not circumvent express or implied congressional 
instructions. Watts, Sunstein, and Vermeule want the courts to 
legitimate agency activity in part if it has a presidential endorsement. 
Sunstein and Vermeule are prepared to accept such reasons because 
“the President is highly accountable.”133 For the reasons identified 
earlier,134 one can dispute the claim that the President is “highly 
accountable.” 
 
 128. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 161–62. 
 129. Id. at 162. 
 130. Id. at 182–83. 
 131. Id. at 162.  
 132. Id. at 161.  
 133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 134. See supra notes 109–122 and accompanying text. 
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Watts is less trusting and would ban citing administration 
preferences if they constitute raw or partisan politics. But it is not clear 
how a court would make that determination in the context of 
rulemaking inaction where there is a limited record and litigants who 
challenge inaction are handicapped by that limitation. 
More fundamentally, the trio has untethered administrative law 
from the principle that the president must act consistently with an 
agency’s mandate unless Congress establishes that obligation in an 
express or implied manner. This leaves presidential compliance with 
agency mandates to the judgment of judges, centering upon whether 
Congress has “explicitly or impliedly” limited the president’s freedom 
of action and weakens the protection of administrative law as a 
guarantor of the rule of law. 
Sunstein and Vermeule might respond that, if Congress has not at 
least impliedly limited agency compliance with presidential 
preferences that do not relate to an agency’s statutory mandate, the 
rule of law is not challenged. Congress has left it up to the agency and 
the president when to engage in rulemaking inaction. But this response 
ignores the overall thrust of the legislation to protect regulatory 
beneficiaries. When Congress passes a law protecting people or the 
environment, it is not accurate to read that law as saying you can dump 
this protection in favor of some other presidential priority—say foreign 
policy—if you would like to do so. The law itself is an explicit rejection 
of that premise. 
Different people will reach different conclusions concerning the 
appropriate balance between politics and policy in rulemaking based 
on their experiences and expectations. My goal is to protect the 
interests of statutory beneficiaries in the context of rulemaking 
inaction. Along with Judge Skelly Wright, I am concerned that 
“important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are 
not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal 
bureaucracy.”135 Administrative law does this best when it requires 
agencies to defend their choices as consistent with their statutory 
mission without regard to presidential preferences that are, for the 
most part, unaccountable to the electorate or unaccountable in time to 
protect the interests of regulatory beneficiaries. 
 
 135. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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C. Less Passive Judicial Review 
If administrative law is to be legal civics, judges will have to 
employ a less deferential form of review than the toothless scope of 
review now used for rulemaking inaction. Instead of “extremely 
limited” and “highly deferential” review,136 the courts should expect 
agencies to offer an adequate explanation for the rejection of a petition 
or a delay in responding to a petition. The scope of review, in other 
words, should be just the same as when an agency adopts a rule, 
prompting a judge to take a hard look at the agency’s explanation.137 
What constitutes an adequate explanation, however, would be adjusted 
in light of the lack of a rulemaking record and the necessity of agency 
priority setting. 
How a judge employs hard look review would necessarily have to 
change. When a judge reviews a rulemaking record, he or she he can 
compare the agency’s justification for its actions with the record it has 
compiled. As there is no similar record in inaction cases, hard look 
review needs to be adapted. Although a judge cannot dive into a 
record, she or he can expect an agency to offer more than a perfunctory 
defense of its inaction and to back up its claims about priorities with an 
explanation that is “adequate” to back up these claims. 
If, for example, the agency claims a lack of resources, judges 
should expect budget details about the agency’s inability to work on 
more rulemaking projects. If the agency claims that it has higher 
priorities, the judge should expect the agency to explain why the other 
rules being drafted are more likely to fulfill its statutory mandate. 
At the same time, judges should be reluctant to accept an 
explanation for inaction that posits an agency is too busy deregulating 
to take up regulatory proposals. An important aspect of this mood 
change is the recognition that agencies have an obligation to engage in 
regulation as defined by their statutory mandate. Judges should 
therefore be skeptical if an agency defends rulemaking inaction on the 
grounds it is too busy deregulating to work on new protections. That 
reason should be unacceptable because it is not one that is within the 
ambit of the agency’s legislative mandate. 
 
 136. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & 
Forwarders Ass’n. of Am. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).  
 137. DANIEL A. FARBER, LISA HEINZERLING & PETER M. SHANE, REFORMING 
“REGULATORY REFORM”: A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR AGENCY RULEMAKING IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 13 (Oct. 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Oct-2018-
APA-Farber-Heinzerling-Shane-issue-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FPW-HB7U].  
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That said, this does not mean that an agency should not be able to 
engage in a mix of activities including rule revocation, modification, 
and inaction as well as protective regulations. But the agency does need 
to offer a justification that its particular overall approach is consistent 
with its statutory mandate. 
This new mood also does not preclude an agency from choosing to 
work on some rules rather than others based on legal and political 
factors. Once again, however, the agency is obligated to defend its mix 
as furthering its statutory mission to protect the public or the 
environment. Avoiding problematic rules and working instead on 
more feasible rules serves that mission. 
I have a hesitation, however, about Sharon Jacobs’s proposal 
allowing agencies to accept, as a justification for rulemaking inaction, 
that the judicial or political environment is unfavorable.138 As said, 
when an agency lives to fight another day, it may better its chances to 
engage in the type of protections that Congress mandated in its 
statute.139 In a deregulatory administration, however, such a “practical 
consideration” may permit an agency to go years without any forward 
motion toward protecting regulatory beneficiaries.140 It is one thing to 
choose protective rules that have a better chance of being implemented 
for legal and political reasons, but it is another to stop work on 
protective rules because the president is not committed to protecting 
regulatory beneficiaries. At bottom, this justification violates the 
agency’s statutory mandate to protect the public. 
The aim is to change the “mood” of judicial review.141 Use of hard 
look review, instead of soft look review, recognizes the judiciary’s 
responsibility to ensure that an agency action and inaction are both 
within the agency’s statutory delegation; both types of “action” require 
the same level of judicial scrutiny. The redefinition of the scope of 
review would signal that regulatory beneficiaries are no longer second-
class citizens when it comes to ensuring the rule of law, but instead are 
entitled to the same scope of review as regulated entities. Whether a 
court is reviewing action or inaction, the question is the same: Is the 
 
 138. See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 
616 (2014) (asserting that agencies should be able to avoid political and legal entanglements).  
 139. Id. at 606.  
 140. See id. (proposing that courts recognize political and legal impediments as practical 
constraints). 
 141. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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agency operating within the legal space as specified by its legislative 
mandate? 
Skeptics will object that judges are likely to do more harm than 
good once they engage in more searching review of the reasons that 
agencies offer for rulemaking inaction. The idea is that courts will be 
able to avoid blundering in light of the complexity involved in priority 
setting and the multiple factors that an agency considers. The courts, 
however, can employ judicial remands to require a more adequate 
justification if an agency falls short, which protects judges from rushing 
in to readjust an agency’s priorities.142 My proposal does expect 
agencies to be able to explain their inaction decisions with persuasive 
details, but it allows judges to accept those explanations once they are 
forthcoming. 
It is also possible that a change in the definition of the scope of 
review would make no difference. Once agencies furnished some 
additional information, judges would then continue to defer to agency 
explanations for the same reasons they now employ uber-deference—
not wanting to interfere with agency priority setting and the lack of a 
record that could be used to check the validity of the agency’s reasons. 
Judges, however, may not be so inclined once agencies have a 
judicially enforced obligation to offer an “adequate” explanation for 
inaction, one that consists of more than a rudimentary recitation of a 
lack of resources and higher priorities. The requirement of adequate 
reasons will remind judges that Congress has established both a floor 
and a ceiling when it passes regulatory legislation, and the failure to be 
more inquisitive regarding inaction constitutes a judicial failure to 
enforce the floor. At the moment, by comparison, the idea of a 
legislative floor is invisible to judges. The assumption appears to be 
that Congress has delegated priority setting to agencies, and courts 
honor this request by using uber-deference. In short, once the 
framework of review is changed, the results are more likely to change 
as well. 
Moreover, once judges ask agencies for more specific information 
as to why they are rejecting a rulemaking petition, there is more 
opportunity for petitioners to challenge the decision than under the 
current judicial genuflection to agency justifications that waive the flag 
of resources and not much more. 
 
 142. Garland, supra note 79, at 565.  
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There are two additional advantages to my proposal. First, more 
skeptical judicial review can incentivize agencies to create a priority 
setting process or improve an existing process, something that agencies 
always do or keep up to date.143 It can also force agencies to offer 
concrete information to back up assertions about agency priorities 
more quickly and efficiently. More generally, a priority setting process 
is a key element of effective implementation of an agency’s statutory 
mandate when it identifies the best ways to achieve an agency’s 
statutory mandate to protect people and the environment. In short, it 
is good governance. 
Second, the public will gain more information about agency 
priorities and resources when judges expect agencies to offer more 
detailed explanations for a lack of action. In this sense, an “explained” 
delay is better than an “unexplained” delay.144 In particular, agency 
explanations based on a lack of resources may signal to Congress that 
agencies lack sufficient funding to implement more worthwhile rules to 
protect people and the environment. As I have discussed elsewhere, 
there is a lack of information regarding what additional protections an 
agency could adopt if it had additional resources.145 
It is also possible that soft look review will divert an agency from 
working on current projects because of the obligation to offer a more 
adequate explanation or to respond to a judicial remand to do so.146 As 
stated, an agency can reduce the resources it expends on defending 
inaction in court by establishing and using a priority setting process. 
But, even if there is some loss of agency efficiency, it is a price worth 
paying because of the advantages of soft review identified in the 
previous paragraphs. 
Despite these improvements, there is a practical limit to the extent 
to which judges will be able to ferret out the strategic use of inaction as 
a deregulatory tool. Although judicial review will be less deferential, it 
will still be deferential. And it should be. Judges will still be 
handicapped by the lack of a record against which they can test the 
claims made by the agency regarding inaction. To adopt a cliché, 
 
 143. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 187–88 (noting that OSHA, for example, 
“has no way to choose among the many projects that are putatively on its agenda”). 
 144. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 66, at 1496. 
 145. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 69, 227 (explaining that Congress lacks 
information about how much money agencies need to implement their statutory mission).  
 146. See Jacobs, supra note 138, at 613 (objecting to expanding reason-giving for inaction on 
the grounds that it would take more agency resources and therefore significantly exacerbate an 
agency’s lack of resources). 
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however, we should not let perfect be the enemy of the good. The 
courts can do a better job of policing inaction, and they should do so. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Trump administration may be the first presidency to go four 
years without promulgating new significant regulations to protect 
people and the environment. But the use of rulemaking inaction as a 
deregulatory strategy has been employed in previous administrations 
hostile to government regulation. Although administrative law 
protects regulatory beneficiaries when agencies revoke or modify 
previous rules, those protections evaporate when an agency rejects a 
rulemaking petition, fails to answer a petition for years, or fails to work 
on pending regulatory protections. 
This state of affairs arises because the courts have been reluctant 
to second-guess agency inaction based on agency priority setting, and 
reasonably so because of the difficulty of judging whether an agency 
has struck the proper balance among the multiple factors that go into 
priority setting. In effect, the courts have outsourced agency 
accountability for rulemaking inaction to political oversight. 
As a defense of the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, political 
accountability is the “Maginot Line” of oversight. And even if voters 
would somehow replace a president who ignores their interests, that 
president will still have delayed protections for up to eight or more 
years, given how long it would take an administration interested in 
protection to promulgate new significant rules. 
Despite the difficulty of judging an agency’s claim that it has 
higher priorities or that it needs more time to make a decision, the 
courts can still do better. Administrative law constrains politics by 
requiring agencies to justify their actions as consistent with their 
legislative mandates. Instead of merely accepting agency claims about 
priorities, the courts should demand more detailed explanations. If 
explanations fall short, remands to allow the agency another chance to 
explain would be in order. Although not a cure for administration 
obstructionism, judicial review would no longer be a parchment 
barrier. 
Raising judicial expectations about what constitutes an adequate 
explanation for rulemaking inaction, even if it has only modest impact, 
aligns this area of the law with the role of administrative law in setting 
a floor and ceiling on agency policymaking. Just as an agency cannot 
exceed its statutory authority, it should not be able to avoid it either by 
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inaction. If administrative law is to legitimize agency action, the courts 
must enforce, as best they can, an agency’s obligation to protect people 
or the environment. 
